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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between education and
democracy. It argues that in order for education to have a meaningful impact on prospects
for a sustainable democracy, educational systems must support democratic principles and
ideals. The main focus of this study is Africa. In order to assess this hypothesis, the study
uses a case study approach examining the education models of three Africa countries:
Botswana, Ghana, and Uganda- to determine whether education has played a role in
fostering democratic values in society. These three countries were chosen because each
offers a variation on Africa’s political development; Botswana has maintained its
democracy since independence; Ghana has reverted to democracy after oscillations of
civilian and military rule; and, Uganda has adopted formal democratization after 30 years
of autocratic rule and civil war. Ever since the nationalist movements of the 1950s and
1960s, education has played an integral role in the development policies of many African
countries. In recent decades, due in part to various constitutional reforms directed
towards a revival of democracy, governments have implemented universal education
programs and committed extensive budgets to educational development. Moreover, there
has been special emphasis on promoting civic education as a means of improving
democratic citizenship. The study finds that in Botswana, education has supported a fairly
robust democracy but much remains to be done with respect to democratic rights. In
Ghana, the education system is based on a model of inclusiveness but there remains rural
to urban and gender disparity. Finally, in Uganda, the education system has helped to
maintain stability but not democratic legitimacy. This study concludes that while African
education models have to a certain degree promoted democratic ideals, it is not clear that
they have yet been sufficient for fostering democratic values and behaviors.

Introduction: Rationale
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If the next century is going to be characterized as a truly African century, for social
and economic progress of the African people, the century of durable peace and
sustained development in Africa, then the success of this project is dependent on the
success of our education systems. For nowhere in the world has sustained development
been attained without a well-functioning system of education, without universal and
sound primary education, without an effective higher education and research sector,
without equality of educational opportunity. – President Thabo Mbeki1
It is very easy to tout the importance of education. However, it may not be as easy to
define because education means a lot of different things to different people. Put simply
education is “the totality of learning activities that occur in formal, non-formal, and
informal contexts.”2 It “exists in all societies in different forms and contents, as
individuals and groups move through their life stages.”3 Taken a step further one may
also suggest that a great part of what education is lies in what it does. Indeed, one has
only to observe the transformative power of education in the life of an individual and on
society as a whole to understand the depth of its purpose.
Education allows the mind of an individual to grasp ideas and concepts. It instills
values and principles that aid in the development of one’s physical, mental, and social
well-being. It is through the education process that individuals develop the ability to
learn, to think, and to reason. Individuals are therefore, equipped with the tools to build
self confidence, to become self-sufficient, and to develop critical perspectives.
Furthermore, through education, citizens acquire the skills and competencies to become
productive members of society and learn about their societies’ values and its political
culture.

1

President Thabo Mbeki, Opening Speech, Conference on Education for African Renaissance in the
Twenty-first Century. Johannesburg, South Africa, December 6, 1999.
2
S. Walters, “Adult education in lifelong learning in Southern Africa,” quoted in Tonic Maruatona.
“Lifelong learning for facilitating democratic participation in Africa.” International Journal of Lifelong
Education. 25 (2006): 548.
3
Ibid.
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From the point of view of states and governments, this “transforming” effect of
education “is premised on the idea that [formal] education will provide the catalyst for
economic, social, and political development” of both the individual and society.4 The
conventional thinking views literacy as being the basis of all education. It begins with
reading and progresses through a continuum of learning in various stages of the education
process. While education entails more than the ability to read and write, it is widely
accepted that literacy is a fundamental prerequisite for modernization since the more
literate the population of a country, the better the chances for the development of those
institutions which are found in all advanced modern societies. “If we cannot say that a
‘high’ level of education is a significant condition for democracy, the available evidence
does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition in the modern world.”5
While there are good examples of contemporary societies that remain non-democratic or
lack strong democratic institutions in spite of very high literacy levels (Zimbabwe 89
percent, Libya 80 percent, China 93.3 percent, and Singapore 96.3 percent),6 the idea of
education as a precondition for democracy has remained relatively strong and hard to
debunk.
The relationship between education and democracy can be seen in many areas. In
keeping with the “modernizing” concept education is seen to promote democracy
“because it leads to prosperity, which in turn produces a middle class and fosters the
development of middle class values such as self autonomy, independence of thought, and

4

Kingsley Banya and Juliet Elu. “The World Bank and Financing Higher Education in Sub-Saharan
Africa.” Higher Education. 42 (2001): 3.
5
Lipset, 80.
6
Ibid
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the right to self-determination.”7 Through this enlightened process the individual
presumably gains a liberal outlook on life which “enables [him] to understand the need
for norms of tolerance” and cooperation and the intelligence to resist “extremist and
monistic doctrines.”8 Therefore, this educated class promotes a “culture of democracy”;
they are more politically engaged and have the “confidence to resist oppressive rule and
the skills for fighting repression, including the language for articulating opposition to
repression and demanding self government.”9 Furthermore, it is through the “culture” of
the politically informed that political institutions derive legitimacy, thereby sustaining
democratic systems.
My research attempts to build on the idea that there is a relationship between
education and democracy, that is, education enriches democratic principles. The idea is
that education is a crucial element for democratization because it is within the education
process that democratic habits are learned and cultivated. In the following pages I will
review some of the ideas linking education to democracy. My objective is to demonstrate
that changes in the education models adopted in Africa are essential to the democratic
process. Specifically, my thesis seeks to assess whether education models can be
restructured to be more democratic in practice and thus, foster democratic values and
behaviors: political participation, civic competence, political tolerance, support for
democracy, and institutional trust.10 I focus on Africa for a number of reasons, primarily
because democratic transitions in Africa tend to contradict the well-known approaches

7

Ibid
Lipset, 79.
9
Boadi, 2.
10
Susan E. Finkel,“Can Democracy be taught?” Journal of Democracy. 14 (2003): 139.
8
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that predict an elite-initiated transition for authoritarian regimes. The other reason is that
in contrast to other regions democracy in Africa has not firmly taken hold.
I will argue that education in and of itself is not sufficient to foster democratic values
and behaviors. My hypothesis is that in order for education to have a meaningful impact
on prospects for a sustainable democracy, educational systems must support democratic
principles and ideals. Especially for countries in Africa, where there has been a lack of
democratic progress, I believe that deliberate efforts must be made to improve all levels
of learning and the substance of education policies.
The basis for my argument is the evolution of the idea that development includes more
than economic growth. The conventional view of development based largely on
indicators expressed as national averages, has been superseded by a more integrated
approach that grew out of the norms evolving at the end of the Cold War. This “new”
concept was in response to a normative shift in which democracy and good governance
became the focus of the new development discourse.11 Having experienced the policy
failures of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 1980s, development
specialists began to explore broader, more holistic definitions of development for
developing countries.12 Development came to mean a more integrated approach that
amalgamated the narrowly defined economic with the broader more complex elements of
political, civil, and human development. It is within this multipronged development
strategy that the current debate is framed.
This study is important because in the view of most analysts, Africa’s development
depends on the success of democracy. However, for this to be possible a culture of
11

Rita Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa.
London: Zed Books, 2000: 25.
12
Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development. Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press, Inc, 2004: 49.
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democracy is needed for both the consolidation and sustainability of democratic political
systems. Since “democratic values and behaviors are socially learned and are not
genetic,”13 governments, say scholars, through sustained efforts, should adopt education
policies that build the capacity for citizens to learn about their rights and responsibilities
and the democratic process.

13

Clive Harber, “Education, Democracy, and Poverty Reduction in Africa.” Comparative Education, 38
(2002): 267.
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Chapter Two: Research Design

As I stated in my introduction this thesis seeks to assess whether education models can
be restructured to be more democratic in practice and, in doing so, foster democratic
values and behaviors. My hypothesis is that in order for education to have a meaningful
impact on prospects for sustainable democracy, education systems must support
democratic principles and ideals. I will develop first a review of the pertinent literature.
This will be followed by an analysis and evaluation of the state of education in the
context of Africa. In order to further investigate the relationship between education and
democracy a case study approach will be used to determine the role of education in
democracy in Africa. Here I will be using three education models as case studies:
Botswana’s Education for Kagisano, Ghana’s Free Compulsory Universal Basic
Education (FCUBE), and Uganda’s universal primary education (UPE) program. In my
final analysis I hope to offer a set of democratic education recommendations that can
contribute to Africa’s democratic development.
Since independence in 1966, Botswana has strived to maintain its democratic
institutions even as other authoritarian dictatorships prevailed in other African countries.
Having experienced similar challenges and setbacks to its development, the government
devised an educational model, “Education for Kagisano” to meet the needs of Botswana
and to help build a democratic society. Ghana represents a country that is democratizing.
After its independence, it embraced democracy, but later the country underwent
successive military dictatorships. In spite of this, education has been foremost on the
country’s policy agenda. Having reverted to civilian rule in the late 1980s, the
government has made deliberate efforts to develop universal primary education as a
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means of enhancing democracy and development. Unlike Botswana and Ghana, Uganda
has lacked both strong democratic institutions as well as a robust commitment to
education. After decades of autocratic rule and civil war, Uganda returned to elective
national government in 1996 and instituted a series of education reforms intended to
enhance the equity of educational access. My analysis of its education model will focus
however, on the efforts to promote civic education within a broader democratic
framework.
In discussing each case I ask the following questions: First, how effective have the
education models been at providing access to primary and secondary education? I ask this
because an educated citizenry is considered to be a prerequisite for democracy, and a
human right by many, as discussed in my literature section. Second, does the education
provided specifically support democratic ideals? If so, how? By democratic “ideals” I
mean the ideals that are commonly associated with free political systems. According to
Robert Dahl, these systems allow for individual freedoms and rights such as the freedom
of speech, the right to vote, and the freedom to compete for political support.1 Yet
democracy embodies more than just the formal manifestations of voting and competitive
elections. It involves an equally substantive criterion of values that must be embedded
within society for democracy to be consolidated. I will expand in greater detail on the
definition of democracy and its application in the African context in the literature section
below.
Review of the Literature
What is Democracy?

1

Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven Ct: Yale University Press, 1971. p. 3.
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Because democracy, or rather democratization has eluded the African region for
decades, to the point where many scholars had doubted, with few exceptions (Botswana,
Mauritius), Africa’s ability to move towards democracy, a working definition is
necessary for an ideological foundation.2
Defining democracy is no easy endeavor because a great part of how it is
conceptualized is viewed in procedural terms. If, for example, we adopt Dahl’s twodimensional schema of “public contestation” and “inclusiveness” democracy is defined as
a political system that focuses on institutions and freedoms.3 This is embodied in Joseph
A. Schumpeter’s ideal of a “free competition for a free vote”4 as well as Terry Lynn
Karl’s analysis which favors the more formal institutions of democracy.5 Procedural
elements such as elections, voting, and political parties have dominated the democratic
transition discourse of both traditional and contemporary scholars. Indeed, in the African
context democratization was often judged by the regularity and presumed “freeness” of
elections, as this was perceived as a rejection of authoritarian rule (single-party, military,
and one-man) and the embrace of democracy. Proponents of the procedural perspective
contend that this minimalist approach offers the potential benefit of broader
comparability across space and time;6 they make the task of measurement easier. While
this may indeed facilitate greater analysis of democratic systems, as indicated by M.D.
Fails “the transformation from authoritarianism to… democracy necessitates more than

2

Samuel Decalo, “The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of Democratization in Africa.” African Affairs.
91 (1992): 7.
3
Dahl, 4.
4
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper Perennial, 1942.
p.271.
5
Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics. 23 (1990): 121.
6
Elke Zuern, “Democratization as liberation: competing African perspectives on democracy.”
Democratization. 16 (2009): 587.
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the simple introduction of elections, political parties, and universal suffrage;”7 It requires
a substantive definition of democracy that includes a normative criterion alongside
electoral procedures and civil and political rights for a country to be deemed a
democracy.8
This point is well taken by Elke Zuern in Democratization as Liberation: competing
African perspectives on democracy, who argues that a procedural understanding of
democracy robs democracy of its key content.9 Larry Diamond, for instance, notes that
democratization is a developmental phenomenon and that the emergence of liberal
democracies depends on the extension and deepening of procedural reforms to include
substantive elements like government responsiveness and a strong rule of law.10
According to Michael Bratton and Eric Chang, the rule of law is “an irreducible
component of democracy”;11 however, a great part of the substantive component also
includes accountability to the electorate and transparency within government. The
inclusion of substantive conceptions to the present analysis, aids in our understandings of
how citizens learn about, evaluate, and shape their attitudes on the legitimacy of
democracy. In this context, citizens must support the principles of democracy but, at the
same time, they develop certain expectations of what democracy should be.

7

Matthew D Fails, “Does substantive democratization create more committed democrats? Surprising
evidence from Africa.” Democratization. 16 (2009): 844.
8
Zuern, 587.
9
Zuern, 586
10
Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1999:
11
Michael Bratton and Eric Chang. “State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards,
Backwards, or Together?” Comparative Political Studies 39 (2006): 1059-83.
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Too often discussions and debates on what democracy is or ought to be tend to treat
the concept as the exclusive “property” of the West.12 As a result European and American
understandings of democracy are often repackaged as universal. While this is
understandable given the level of development of Western democratic systems,
democracy “has long been in existence in many non-Western countries depending on the
local definition of the concept.”13 This is to say that democracy cannot only be defined
from the Western perspective but also from the perspective of other cultures. This is
especially so for African countries where traditional values play a definitive role in their
societies’ conception of democracy. For example, in Botswana and South Africa, the
employment of locally derived concepts based on consensus through open discussion is
central to the construction of democratic institutions and ideals; “such understandings are
a product of historical practices as well as the successes and failures of local struggles for
democracy, and it is from these experiences that substantive understandings are
derived.”14
That a great part of democratic legitimacy was lacking in Africa is understandable
given that many citizens were socialized into an authoritarian post-colonial system that
did not promote substantive democratic ideals.15 Moreover, the nature of their colonial
experience did not permit much in the way of democratic development; “most of the
electoral regimes left behind by the departing imperialist powers [had] broken down…
due to the boundaries drawn by the colonial powers, which created artificial countries out

12

Michael Bamidele Adeyemi and Lewis Asimeng-Boahene. “Democracy and Social Studies Education at
the Junior Secondary School Level in Botswana.” Pastoral Care (June 2001): 16.
13
Adeyemi and Asimeng- Boahene, 17.
14
Zuern, 591.
15
Fails, 843.
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of diverse peoples.”16As a consequence, “citizens… developed attitudes toward
democracy in the context of weak, incomplete democracies whose substantive reforms
[did not] match the scope and pace of procedural democratization.”17 For that reason,
many democratizing African countries “[had] some attributes of democratic political life,
including at least limited political space for opposition parties and independent civil
society, as well as regular elections and democratic constitutions.”18 However, they
suffered from a crisis of legitimacy, “often including poor representation of citizens’
interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by
government officials…, and very low levels of public trust in state institutions.”19 By
bringing to the forefront questions of legitimacy and equality, a substantive approach to
democratization has profound implications for both theoretical understanding, as well as
the practicality of democracy. Especially for citizens coming of age during democratic
transitions, substantive elements may help to address many of the “challenges that
procedural understandings fail to capture.”20
The concept of democratic legitimacy is developed further by Gabriel A. Almond and
Sidney Verba in their classic study The Civic Culture.21 In their analysis, the scholars
emphasize the importance of “political attitudes and an underlying set of social attitudes
that is supportive of a stable democratic process.”22 These attitudes are defined as the
“civic culture” one that combines modernity with tradition and is “based on

16

Larry Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan Linz. “Building and Sustaining Democratic
Government in Developing Countries: Some Tentative Findings.” World Affairs. 150 (1987): 6.
17
Fails, 854.
18
Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy. 13 (2002): 9.
19
Ibid
20
Zuern, 587.
21
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.
22
x
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communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that
permitted change but moderated it.”23 The civic culture in the democratic context
describes the actions, the attitudes, and the relationships of citizens with the political
system and its various parts, as well as the role of the individual in the system. It is within
this “culture” that the political system is “internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and
evaluations of its population… as people are inducted into it just as they are socialized
into nonpolitical roles and social systems.24 Hence, democracy is not only conceived as a
political system but, by its very nature, is accepted by both elites and masses as an
extension of associational living.
Democracy clearly requires a system of procedures, as well as a system of values to
be consolidated into permanent, consistent, autonomous institutions.25 Taken together
both components are integral to the emergence of liberal democracy. Given that people
associate democracy with many diverse meanings due to their experiences with the
political system and their position in the social structure, their perception of the
legitimacy of democracy is based on the regime’s success at providing a variety of goods.
Effectiveness of democratic regimes heavily affects their stability. As asserted by Larry
Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan Linz, “one of the primary reasons for the
instability of democratic and non-democratic regimes in the Third World has been the
combination and interaction of low legitimacy and low effectiveness.26 Thus for many
ordinary African citizens, democracy was often shaped by the regime’s inability to

23

6
13
25
Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton. “Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance,
and Experience.” American Journal of Political Science. 51(2007):192.
26
Diamond, Lipset, and Linz. 7.
24
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deliver political goods such as increased personal freedoms, as well as goods that affected
their material well- being such as education and employment for all.
According to Evelyn Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens in their
Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimension,
the promotion of democratic policies that include social and economic criteria enables
more citizens to participate in the political process, which in turn contributes to the
consolidation and deepening of democracy.27 Although this may be conceived as
bordering on a socialist approach, the African experience is such that pure mechanical
elements may not be sufficient for viable progress; democracy must at once allow for free
expression and the promotion of individual and collective interests, but it must also
provide a forum for fighting social and economic inequality as this increases the promise
of political equality. Furthermore, “because the legitimacy of a stable, consolidated
regime rests on a more unqualified and enduring commitment to the political system,”28 a
democracy that engenders substantive elements is able to survive periods of crisis.
Variations notwithstanding, the unique context of Africa’s “neopatrimonialism”29 had
the effect of producing neither the economic development nor the nation building that
was promised; in the decades after independence most of Africa was economically
bankrupt and on the brink of political demise. When the pro-democracy movement came
of age in 1990, according to Samuel Decalo, “the continent was already more than ripe

27

Evelyn Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary
Democracy: Formal, Participatory and Social Dimensions.” Comparative Politics. 29 (1997): 324.
28
Diamond, Lipset, and Linz, 6.
29
Neo-patrimonialism refers to the authoritarian regimes in Africa that were characterized by
individualized rule of ‘big men’, systematic ‘clientelism’ as the principal basis of political support, and
blurred distinctions between public and private resources. They contrasted sharply with the bureaucratic
authoritarian regimes that had ruled in Latin America and Southern Europe.
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for upheaval.”30 The call for democracy was not just for a political birthright, but for a
total revision of the fundamental charter of the State.31 Before the collapse of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, 38 of Africa’s then 50 countries were governed by neopatriamonial
regimes of varying hues.32 By 1991, “more than half… responded to domestic and
international pressures by holding competitive presidential or legislative elections.”33
Since then Africa has experienced a second independence, with all that implies for a
revival of democracy.34 Despite this, the transitions are far from being uniform. Some
countries advanced to more elective forms of democracy (Ghana, Malawi, Namibia,
South Africa).Others however, were less successful and relapsed into what some
observers have described as a “gray zone”35 either slowly advancing towards democratic
transitions or are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy (Sudan, Central
African Republic, Ivory Coast). Nevertheless, there is an overwhelming outpouring of
support for democracy; more and more citizens are rejecting the “old” systems of African
rule and are demanding a greater role in the determination of their futures.
Theoretical Approaches to Education and Democracy
Having discussed democracy in the context of Africa’s political development, I will
now turn my attention to several theoretical frameworks that may highlight our
understanding of the relationship between education and democracy. Although much of
the research on the effects of education on the support for democracy is limited in

30

Decalo,14.
Ibid.
32
J.R. Minis. “Adult education and the African state in the post- Cold War era.” Convergence. 26 (1993):
11.
33
Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle. “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in
Africa.” World Politics. 46 (1994): 453.
34
Cyril K. Daddieh, “Beyond Governance and Democratization in Africa: Toward State Building for
Sustainable Human Development.” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa. 1 (1999).
35
Carothers, 9.
31
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applicability and scope with respect to African countries where democracy is a relatively
new phenomenon, arguments in favor of the importance of schooling for democratic
development remain relatively strong.
The theoretical frameworks most applicable to the adoption of education’s role in
democracy are Modernization Theory and Human Capital Theory. Both theories are
consistent with the Liberalist school of thought. Having already defined education I wish
here to focus on the more formal institutions of learning. As indicated earlier in Chapter
1, education provides broad exposure to new ideas and concepts that at once enlighten the
individual and give him a liberal outlook on life. Through this “liberal” perspective the
educated individual is able to develop his or her rational faculties by acquiring attitudes
of tolerance and greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor of
social control.36 That liberalism, in the classic sense, is commonly associated with
individual rights and freedoms, education presumably reinforces liberal conceptions of
autonomous thought, free citizenship, and concomitant political rights.
This is in the same vein as John Dewey’s classic Democracy and Education, where
education is conceived as the process that transforms man from a creature of “instinct and
appetite” into a “truly moral, rational, and free being.”37 Although Dewey does not
explicitly say how education leads to democracy nor propose education as a means to a
political end, he conceives of education as itself valuable and of great importance to the
flourishing of democracy. For Dewey, education is primarily a social function “which
centrally influences the variety we see in basic political understandings and conflicts.”38

36

John Dewey, Democracy and Education. The Mac Millian Company (1916): 91. Republished by Penn
State University. Electronic Classic Series.
37
Dewey, 100.
38
E.T. Weber, “Dewey and Rawls on Education.” Human Studies. 31 (2008): 362.
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The quest for education therefore, should be the “formation of a society that can develop
its own rich, fertile, and adaptable conceptions of justice.”39 Thus education, in the ideal
sense, facilitates inquiry, participation, plurality of ideas, and progress. This however,
Dewey reasons, can only be conducted within a democratic society, “which makes
provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which
secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms
of associational life.”40
Modernization Theory and the role of Education in Democracy
Possibly one of the strongest arguments supporting the relationship between education
and democracy is Seymour Martin Lipset’s Modernization Theory. In what is often
referred to as Lipset’s hypothesis, the scholar conceives of democracy as emerging from
a combination of social forces that, when taken together, leads to the transformation of a
modern society. In Lipset’s analysis economic development and legitimacy of political
institutions are considered the fundamental requisites of the modern society. However,
higher levels of literacy and education, he argues, are key variables in economic
development, which promotes political development in general and democracy in
particular. According to Lipset
Education presumably broadens men’s outlooks, enables them to understand the
need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremists and
monistic doctrines, and increases their capacities to make rational electoral
choices41
The premise of Lipset’s argument is that democracy must involve the functional
interdependence of specific elements in order to be sustained. A high level of education

39

363.
Dewey, 104.
41
Lipset, 79.
40
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and literacy serve democracy by increasing the standard of living for citizens, especially
those of the lower classes, while also providing resources to mitigate the tensions
produced by political conflict as well as to inhibit anti-democratic forces.42
Later analysts of Modernization Theory criticize Lipset’s argument as overly
deterministic and ethnocentric. For example, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi
have argued that the hypothesis does not consider exogenous factors and historical
conditions in the democratic transition process. Indeed, the experience of late transitions
in the 1980s and possibly the movements that we see today in the Middle East, may
challenge the hypothetical association between wealth and democracy, as there may be
no ideal set of preconditions that is sufficient to produce such an outcome.43 Granted the
preconditions outlined in earlier literature may be better conceived in the future as the
outcomes of democracy, the basic fundamentals of Lipset’s theory still hold. Modern
societies cannot exist without an economically developed and highly educated
population, which when taken together forecast a gradual rise in democracy.44
Human Capital Theory and the Economics of Education
The belief in education as an engine of growth and development is also consistent
with economic theories of capital and investment. The concept of education as human
capital is derived from the idea that an investment in education and training is just as
important as an investment in physical capital for economic growth. In short, the human
capital theorists argue that an educated population is a productive population. The theory
is consistent with the works of several classical economists who “drew attention to the
importance of education as a form of national investment” and its effects on the
42

Ibid.
Karl, 5.
44
Robert J. Barro, “Determinants of Democracy.” The Journal of Political Economy. 107(1999): 160.
43
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distribution of wealth and income.45 Adam Smith pointed out in The Wealth of Nations
that “a man educated at the expense of much labour and time… may be compared to one
of those expensive machines.”46 During the mid-Twentieth century extensive
investigation into the economics of education resulted from the need to explain modern
economic growth that the traditional factors of production did not account for. For
example, in Investment in Human Capital: The Role of Education and of Research,
Theodore W. Schultz has noted that
These advances aside, the state of economic knowledge in general continues to be
burdened by many obsolete views. There is the view that it is necessary for a
country to be well endowed with natural resources if it is to develop a modern
economy. But surely this view is no longer tenable…Japan has demonstrated,
beyond any doubt, that a rich endowment of natural resources is not necessary in
developing a modern economy. Nor is it necessary that a country be large for it to
modernize, as is evident from the success of such countries as Denmark and
Switzerland.47
And he concludes
It is my contention that economic thinking has neglected two classes of
investment that are of critical importance under modern circumstances. They are
investment in man and research.48
Analyses of the relationship between expenditure on education and development have
focused on education’s role in poverty reduction and its future benefits for society as a
whole. In line with human capital theory, governments and international agencies view
increased and improved levels of education as central to both the fight against poverty as

45

M. Woodhall, Economics of Education: A Review. In George Psacharopoulos (ed) Economics of
Education, Research, and Studies. The World Bank, Washington D.C.: Pergamon Press, 1987: p.1
46
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776) Cited in Woodhall M. “Economics of Education: A Review.”
ed. George Psacharopoulos. Economics of Education Research and Studies. The World Bank, Washington
D.C.: Pergamon Press, 1987: 1.
47
Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital: The role of Education and Research. New York.:
The Free Press, 1971: p. 2
48
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well as an essential underpinning for economic growth.49 Moreover, by enabling citizens
to become more productive, education may be crucial to reducing shortages of skilled
manpower, which represents one of the major constraints to economic growth in
developing countries. Given that a great deal of economic theory is concerned with the
vital issue of resource allocation, concepts such as investment in human capital and costbenefit analysis50 will obviously pose challenges to policy-making. However, an analysis
of the returns on investment in education can undoubtedly shed light on the question of
how best to allocate resources most efficiently so as to maximize the benefits of
education.
Education as Human Rights
Within the development literature there is an emerging sentiment that investment in
education is an effective recognition of international human rights. The basis of this
approach is twofold. The first is based on a human rights approach to development in
which education is conceived as a fundamental human right. The second rests on the
notion that education is essential for the realization of other human rights. Although
much of the literature on human rights was generated in the aftermath of the devastation
of World War II (WWII), its intellectual origin lies in the concept of natural rights,
“which provided some of the theoretical foundations for the French and American
revolutions of the late eighteenth-century.”51 The central argument of this concept was
that every individual possesses certain natural rights simply by the nature of being an
individual. These rights are inalienable and must be respected by the state.52 In this
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respect, the concept of human rights, while embodying the same premise as natural
rights, goes a step further to accord those rights to all human beings on the basis of their
humanity.
The right of all persons to an education is explicitly set out in The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights53 and is codified into international law in The United
Nations Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESC)54 and The Convention
on the Rights of the Child.55 The impetus for these norms grew out of the “sudden and
unexpected coming to independence of scores of colonies” in the decades after WWII.
There was an intense desire to chart their destiny, as well as an urgency to formulate and
accelerate economic and social development, which were perceived as necessary for a
transformation to a modern society. Education therefore, embodied these aspirations and
became instrumental to the development strategies promoted by the international
community for these new countries. Often referred to as the “second generation” of
rights, ESC rights differed from the “positive rights” embodied in The UN Convention on
Civil and Political rights in that governments had to undertake deliberate efforts to
promote ESC rights. Thus it was not only sufficient to abstain from certain actions that
violate human dignity, but by extension, governments had a duty to ensure the full
realization of rights. This entails provisions for universal education, as well as the
removal of obstacles that may hinder educational access and achievement.
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Emerging from the development paradigm is the notion that education is also essential
for the exercise of all other human rights.56 In this respect one cannot conceive of
development if individuals are not equipped with the tools to realize these objectives. It is
not enough to promote human rights when citizens lack access to health and education,
economic opportunity, and live in a state of isolation, social inferiority, and
powerlessness.57 According to economist and Nobel Prize recipient, Amartya Sen,
“widening the coverage and effectiveness of…education can have a powerfully
preventative role in reducing human insecurity of nearly every kind.”58 Indeed, on the
most basic level the ability to read and write reduces individual insecurities by promoting
empowerment and individual freedoms of expression and thought. However, the right to
an education of good quality, without discrimination or exclusion, has greater
implications for the realization of gender equity, the pursuit of an adequate standard of
living, and greater participation in the decision-making processes which affect the lives
of individuals. Taken together as a whole, human rights and the processes that reinforce
those rights both become conceptually and operationally inseparable parts of the same
processes of social change.
Education for All: The Dakar Framework for Action
The emphasis on education as a basic human right was further reaffirmed in the World
Declaration on Education for All (EFA)59 and later adopted in a Framework for Action at
the World Education Forum in Dakar. The Dakar Framework for Action produced a
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detailed analysis of the state of basic education around the world with specific steps for
the achievement of the goal of “Education for All” (EFA). The framework sets (6) major
EFA goals that include: expanding and improving early childhood care and education;
reducing inequalities of access and quality; achieving improvements in levels of adult
literacy; ensuring equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programs; free
and compulsory primary education of good quality by 2015; and improving all aspects of
the quality of education.60 Under the guidelines of EFA the goals were to be achieved
through broad based partnerships within countries, supported by co-operation with
regional and international agencies and institutions. Moreover, participants pledged to
develop national action plans and strategies that would promote Education for All, as
well as policies designed to eliminate poverty and promote sustainable development.
At Dakar it was acknowledged that there still remain vast challenges and obstacles to
the achievement of EFA. Of utmost concern were the growing educational disparities
within and between countries, which are commonly affected by political will and a lack
of financial resources. Moreover, it was recognized that although there has been
significant progress in many countries, gains were adversely affected by multiple factors
that “exclude children, young people, and adults from learning opportunities.”61
However, it was effectively established that the realization of EFA was “more likely to
occur where there is a stronger and more vocal recognition of education as a fundamental
human right and where representative democracy has taken root.”62
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Within the African context, EFA goals were adopted under the theme of Education for
African Renaissance in the Globalized Economy, Communication, and Culture.63 Under
this directive participants committed to a new vision for Africa based on democratic
values, respect for the human rights of each individual, and a commitment to sustainable
development. Instrumental to the realization of this “vision” was the reaffirmation that
education is a basic right and as such, a basic need for the transformation of the “new”
Africa. In this respect, participants acknowledged the necessity for improved and
restructured education systems and the need for stronger policies and legislation to
support these structures. Furthermore, there was an emphasis on closer co-operation
between central and local government, schools, communities, and families to facilitate
school ownership, sustainability, and accessibility. It is in this context of the importance
of education as a democracy prerequisite, as a human right, and as a development priority
that this study has been undertaken. In the following chapter, I provide some background
on Africa’s political and educational development before going into detail of my case
studies.
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Chapter Three: Background

One of the most outstanding features of post-colonial leadership in the newly
independent states of Africa has been the overwhelming emphasis placed on education as
a tool to promote development. Education has a “modernizing” effect, and based on the
then widely held assumptions of modernization theory, these new states interpreted high
levels of literacy as a critical foundation from which they hoped the economic revolution
of Africa would be launched. Moreover, there was an international sentiment that
“education… would produce people with the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values
that…were also a sine-qua-non for the process of national integration.”1 Thus in their
desire to be judged by a Western standard of development, these countries felt that
education had both a practical and symbolic function of overwhelming importance.
Indeed, for many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa education played a pivotal role in
forging their national aspirations. Education was, in many respects, central to the
struggles of the post-colonial vanguard leadership in Africa and other countries in the
developing world. Having been elected to a large extent upon promises to extend
education to a wider proportion of the population, the leaders saw the quest for selfdetermination as an educational as well as a political one; education was one of the most
tangible manifestations of progress.2 In spite of the ambitious attempts to develop
education systems, governments were hard-pressed to create a balance between quantity
and quality of the education provided. Moreover, the education models were still to a
great degree shaped and influenced by the institutions and culture of the colonial powers.
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In light of this, the adopted models did not reflect much in terms of an African education.
Furthermore, education as practiced in these societies did not foster democratic values.
The popular demand for education gathered speed after World War II (WWII) with
the emergence of mass nationalist movements. From the West African states to
Equatorial Africa to even Madagascar, there was an intense need for education as the
school became the symbol of the new Africa. Historically, though many of the policies
were established in the period before colonization, the curriculum and practices
perpetuated during colonial rule were based on the teachings of missionaries and, later,
European merchants who emphasized basic literacy for trade and teachings of the Bible.3
The education models therefore, were geared mostly to the primary level while technical
education was not highly developed. This was beneficial to the European governments in
that as “administration and commerce expanded, the colonial authorities and commercial
firms sought indigenous auxiliaries to fill the lower posts,”4 which did not demand
schooling beyond a primary education. The degree to which education was transferred
inevitably varied from territory to territory and from colonial power to colonial power. In
the French colonies education transfer was “characterized as essentially “assimilationist”
in aim, involving the wholesome export of metropolitan culture and institutions to the
colonial area.”5 On the other hand, the British policy was more adaptive in nature and
educational development stressed cooperation between the government and traditional
agencies.
Nevertheless, education became an important aspect of colonial policy and was crucial
to the “development of an exchange economy which interpenetrated with traditional
3
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subsistence activities.”6 This resulted in a European- dominated occupational structure
which had profound effects on educational development and the traditional patterns of
affiliation.7 As a consequence, this socio-demographic change resulted in the growth of
modern-type urban centers which stimulated further demand for formal education. For
instance, in the West African colonies of Ghana (The British Gold Coast) and the Ivory
Coast, the diffusion of formal schooling has been closely correlated with socio-economic
change and urbanization.8 As the cash crop economies stimulated more revenues,
investment in education grew, bringing with it more political influence and control.
Especially in the period following WWI, “African agricultural products were earning a
higher price on the international market, making additional funds available for
education.”9 The period also reflected the changes taking place within the international
system, which forced the European powers to review their past educational activities.10
This was reflected in the establishment of the first Phelps-Stokes Commission11 and its
subsequent report.
At the invitation of the British Colonial Office, the Phelps-Stokes Commission was
dispatched to Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria, British South Africa,
Angola, the Belgian Congo, and Liberia. The central theme of the 1925 Commission’s
report was the need for education for the social and economic development of Black
Africa. It was based on earlier policy guidelines that promoted vocationally-oriented
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education for American “Blacks,” “which was then considered as a form of education
suited for [their] socio-economic and cultural backgrounds.”12 Moreover, the policies
stressed the importance of an African education based, “not upon preconceived notions or
types of schooling transmitted unmodified from Europe or America,”13 but upon the
actual conditions on the ground and the fundamental needs that grow out of them.
Essentially, the Commission changed the education policy guidelines of the European
dependencies; “Britain, France, and Belgium began issuing policy statements outlining in
broad terms the education policy to be followed in the African territories.”14 Despite
these declarations however, the implementation of the “new” policies varied considerably
depending on the preferences of local administrations as well as budgetary limitations,
but more so, as a result of the ideologies underlying colonial practice.
The Colonial Education Framework
An investigation into the formal educational systems in Sub-Saharan Africa reveals
similarities and differences that were to a great extent shaped by their colonial history and
the respective ideologies of the European powers. This much is evident from a review of
the respective mechanisms of colonial administrations. As indicated earlier British and
French policies differed in approach which, as we shall see, had profound effects on
patterns of educational transfer. This was also consistent with the policies of other
metropolitan powers such as Spain and Portugal, where Catholicism was the basis of
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education. However, for the sake of this research I will focus on the more prominent
formal educational systems in the British, French, and Belgian African colonies.
British Education Policy
In the British dependencies the Advisory Committee on Native Education published a
general policy memorandum (Education Policy in British Tropical Africa)15 in 1925
stipulating the guidelines for the future development of education in British Africa. The
guidelines stressed, among other things, greater cooperation between the government and
the local educational agencies, an education that reflected African traditions and
improvement in the overall quality of the educational system. The vision of the new
policy was to give greater relevance and scope to the role of education in the lives of
Africans. Moreover, the general policy “corresponded to the laissez-faire policies [in
Britain] and reflected the preference for a considerable devolution of political authority to
local agencies.”16 As such, the “adaptive” approach, as promoted in the colonies, was in
line with the political orientations of British indirect rule that “emphasized ‘cultural
adaptation’ of metropolitan institutions to local political and social institutions and the
creation of a group of educated Africans.”17
A general outgrowth of British policy was the adaptation of curricula to native life,
“which emphasized the importance of integrating local traditions and local languages into
the educational process.”18 This was implemented in the adoption of “practical,”
“functional” subjects such as agriculture and simpler trades, which was promoted
separately from academic institutions. In keeping with the theme of education within an
15
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African setting, the use of vernacular languages in the first years of primary school was
promoted. In later revisions of the general policy memorandum, education in the British
colonies was strengthened by the development of select academic-type secondary schools
that provided a proportion of students with the skills needed for professional or
semiprofessional occupations. Moreover, later evaluations of the British education
guidelines revealed that there had been a tendency to educate only segments of the
population with little focus on adult education and limited emphasis on building
relationships between school and community. Thus, if Africans were to be the chief
agents in improving African life, the transformation required a single plan of mass
education that included the young, the adolescent, and the adult with varied curricula.
Perhaps as a result of “adaptive” policies the range of educational opportunities available
to Africans was far greater in British than French territories, “and from an early period a
few individuals were able to reach the highest rung of the educational ladder.”19
French Education Policy
The education system in the French colonies did not vary considerably from the
practices instituted in the nineteenth century. The principle of assimilation was still very
much the driver of instruction, as the aim was “the creation of an elite cherishing
metropolitan values- Black Frenchmen, if you will.”20 “Assimilationist” policies tended
to emphasize direct political orientation and the French “preoccupation with the problem
of ensuring the unqualified dominance of the central government.”21 In practice it
allowed the French to exercise tighter, more centralized control over the affairs of their
colonial dependencies. In contrast to the loose supervision of schools in the British
19
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African colonies, the early education systems in French Africa were characterized by
close government supervision and government- certified teaching.22 Moreover, a central
tenet of French colonial education policy was the mandatory use of the French language
as the idiom of instruction. This was consistent with France’s view that its culture was
superior and that it was its colonizing duty “to give birth to this French consciousness in
Africans.”23
The French school system was to perform the dual function of educating the masses
while at the same time creating an educated African minority, who could eventually serve
in the lower ranks of the colonial civil service.24 Maybe more explicitly so than the
British system, the French educational system was highly selective and there was great
emphasis on correlating education with economic development in as much it was the
general policy to guarantee employment to those who had received post primary
education. “By implementing this policy of educational supply and demand, the French
government hoped to prevent the disillusion and disorientation experienced by youths
who were educated but unemployed.”25 This approach however, had greater political
implications in that there was great fear of producing an “educated elite” that would
become a danger to the status quo. “As was the practice in the British dependencies, there
was also a tendency to emphasize vocational and agricultural training to facilitate rural
living but, more so, to avoid the danger of haphazard educational development.26
Following the recommendations of later commissions,27 it was concluded, among other
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things, that education should be expanded to reach more people, and that more African
teachers should be trained and recruited as part of the expansion. Furthermore, there was
an increasing need for institutions of higher learning to train graduates in specialized
fields to meet the economic development requirements of each territory.28
Belgian Education Policy
Formal education systems in the Belgian Congo developed considerably later than
those of the British and French colonies. Belgium’s involvement in Africa began when
the Congo Free State was created as a private empire of King Leopold of Belgium in the
1880s.29 However, it was only after WWI when Belgium took over the Congo from
Leopold that general colonial policies were developed and put in place.30 Official Belgian
recognition of education began in 1906 under a special agreement with the Vatican that
gave Catholic schools the entire responsibility for mission work in the Congo.31 Like the
other European powers, Belgian interest in the African territories was initially motivated
by economic exploitation. Indeed, even before its official colonization the Congo had a
booming rubber industry and by the 1920s mining (copper, tin, diamonds, and some gold)
had expanded greatly. In education, the aim was to provide universal primary education
with the most successful graduates prepared for minor positions in the government or in
business.32 However, Belgium’s education policies in the Congo contrasted in various
ways with those of the British and the French.
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Unlike Britain and France, Belgium was not concerned about creating an African elite.
From the onset it was emphasized that the Belgian system of education could not be
transferred to the Congo and that a new school system would have to be devised instead.
Thus, the idea underlying policies in the Congo was to change and transform the masses,
as there was a presumption of African capabilities as being very limited. This is not to
say that the Belgians were unique in their attitudes. But colonization affected Africans in
the Belgian Congo more intensively and systematically than anywhere else. The ideology
underpinning Belgium’s colonial policy was that Belgium alone knew what was best for
the Congo. In this regard development was based upon the idea of direct rule and
paternalism of a very intense kind.33 Before independence “there were 10,000 Belgian
administrators, judicial officials, and military officers [in the Congo]; higher
proportionately than anywhere else.”34 There was also a high degree of coordination
between the three sectors of penetration, which came to be called the “Trinity”: the
colonial administration (Belgium), the Roman Catholic Church, and private companies.
In essence, all sectors functioned to solidify Belgian objectives and its continued
dominance over the model colony, which was especially evident in the extensive
recruitments of labor for mining and agriculture.
To be certain the Congo had one of the most developed infrastructures in colonial
Africa; before independence it had the highest literacy rate at the primary level35 and
many endemic diseases were all but eliminated through large-scale and persistent
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campaigns. Although later recommendations36 emphasized the need for curriculum
development that included industrial and agricultural subjects and the introduction of
more academic-type schooling, little attention was given to the social and economic
development of the Congolese. Until the 1950s, the Belgians had curbed any form of
post-secondary education for the native Congolese and higher education was not
developed until relatively later with the changes in international policy after WWII.
Towards Independence: Education in Post-Colonial Africa
Moving beyond the colonial analysis, I will turn my attention to the period after WWII
until the 1960s, when there was intense growth in education and when many African
colonies were transitioning to self-rule. For that matter I believe it is important to assess
educational development against the socio-political changes that were at once
transforming the international landscape while at the same time being conditioned by it.
Until WWII, education in most of Sub-Saharan Africa was characterized by the
establishment of mostly primary schools systems, which were the product of often unarticulated government and private initiatives.37 Whatever secondary schools existed
were highly selective and insufficient in number. Initially, the concept of promoting
“community-oriented” schooling satisfied practical needs both for the colonizer and the
colonized. It was believed that such a concept would at once prepare local inhabitants for
social change without breaking with tradition.38 On the other hand, it contributed towards
the stabilization of the overall colonial system, in that the African was committed to the
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land and was “available as a cheap source of [labor] for the white populations.”39 Granted
the European education systems did provide various opportunities to Africans. However,
the adaptive and sometimes imported systems were not adequate and were soon met by
growing resistance from the very people they sought to help.
To be certain many of the objectives recommended by the various commissions were
not achieved. For instance, in Nigeria, early attempts to implement later
recommendations of the Phelps-Stokes commission were abandoned due to the lack of
administrative support and the general difficulty of transposing policy into practice.40
Institutions of higher learning,41 while long existing in colonies such as Ghana
(Achimota) and Senegal (the William Ponty School and the School of Pharmacy at
Dakar), were not operating at their fullest potential due to a lack of skilled instructors and
a scarcity of secondary school graduates. In turn, this resulted from the paucity of
secondary schools, themselves incapable of accommodating the thousands that were
finishing primary school. Overall there still existed a critical shortage of educational
opportunity. Meanwhile, many Africans viewed the education system as a symbol of
political and cultural domination,42 which can be attributed to the differing aspirations
and expectations of the Europeans and the Africans. The former regarded Africans as
incapable of grasping the well-intentioned plans of their “protectors.”43 On the other
hand, for many Africans, both the elite and the rural educated, education, as prescribed by
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their Western masters, did not provide for any fundamental political emancipation or for
placing the black population on an equal footing with Whites.44
Criticisms were leveled against what were initially conceived as the “benevolent” and
“humanistic” objectives of the colonial systems. Many Africans were soon recognizing
the ideological element in the educational systems “and feared that they would receive a
second-class education, which would further consolidate their dependence on and their
exploitation by the white colonial masters.”45 For that matter, the promotion of European
formal education, despite the claims of favoring African development, did not foresee the
conscious awakening it would facilitate in the African and the societal changes that were
to come.
The post-WWII period saw the dissolution of the overseas European empires and the
formation of the United Nations, which coincided with internal movements for greater
educational and political rights. Moreover, the period was reflective of the changing
world climate that supported self-determination and the national independence
movements of all peoples. Within Sub-Saharan Africa these sentiments were
demonstrated by an articulate, well-organized group of intellectuals who “were the
products of the best schools in their own countries and often had been trained in
European and American universities as well.”46 Having been exposed to the liberal
political philosophy of the West, these educated elite became the leaders of nationalist
movements, and embraced the concepts upon which the nationalism of nineteenthcentury Europe had been based to use for their own political ambitions.47
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Perhaps in anticipation for what was to come, both the British and the French began to
reevaluate their respective education systems. In many British colonies where the practice
of a “separate but equal” education was the basis of policy, the colonial administration
increased primary schooling48 and founded more colleges for academic instruction and
teacher training.49 The French moved to abandon their policy of assimilation for one of
association, “whereby the educated elite could become the bridge between the mass of
Africans and the colonial administration.”50 But these measures, however extensive,
could not prevent the inevitable development of nationalist movements that aimed at
eventual independence and a complete break with the so-called mother countries.51 Just
as the concept of self-determination originally conceived by the League of Nations
protected the rights of Europeans, it was now extended under the United Nations and
embraced by all peoples throughout the world.
Education since Independence
By the 1950s, the prospect for independence was clear and significantly intensifying
the pace of change.52 By 1960 17 African countries had gained independence, and 13
others were to become independent states a few years later.53 “The sudden collapse of
the edifice of colonialism and emergence of an [African] political kingdom triggered
even greater expectations and demands” from the masses for more educational
opportunity.54 As a result African governments invested heavily in educational expansion
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and diversification. The political leaders of the new African countries saw in education
not only the key to technological modernization55 but also the crucial element for national
development, which “encompassed the goals of ‘Africanization,’ national unity, and
economic growth.”56 For that matter, the development of education systems was
supposed to create a new African mentality that would transform the coming generations
into future intellectuals, experts, and leaders. Education policy was no longer the
exclusive domain of Departments of Education and was inextricably linked to social and
economic policy. In a relatively short time countries began to expand primary education
and commit extensive budgets to manpower planning and higher education. Especially in
those countries where the colonial system had created a well-trained group of Africans
capable of operating the government, for example Ghana, there were plans to implement
universal primary education (UPE) and greater spending for education development.
The need for greater initiative in African education and development was recognized
at the United Nations Economic Social and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO)
Conference on education in Addis Ababa in 1961. The meeting was instrumental in that it
brought together the ministers of education of independent countries to determine the
state and direction of education in Africa. The central theme of the conference was
education as a means of African development. “It…launched a new development
philosophy based on the recognition that the educational systems, especially higher
education, [should] play a pivotal role in the social, economic, and cultural
transformation of nations.”57 Thus, the new systems, especially at the higher levels,
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should promote African culture and African studies. In the new school curriculum, the
Western systems of education developed under the colonial administrations were to be
adapted to the needs and desires of contemporary African society. To this end, emphasis
was to be placed “on the study of African history, ethnography, and vernacular
languages, and, where it exists, vernacular literature.”58 For the leaders and intellectuals
alike, an effective African education was one that would integrate the values and
strengths of traditional culture with the knowledge and skills required by the new African
realities.
The gains since the 1960s were rather impressive. In many countries there were
significant gains in enrollment, literacy, skilled human resources, and educational
facilities.59 However, despite these accomplishments there still existed problems that
resulted from the implementation of the “new” education systems and from issues that
were never resolved in the post-colonial transitions.
Notably, criticisms arose over the inherited educational models that were expanded
and modified to serve the new socio-economic needs identified by African governments.
There was relatively little departure from the European standards, as schools were highly
centralized and reflected the will of the ruling elites. In some cases as in Guinea, where
education had been designed to further political integration, the ideological views of the
governing party were part of the curriculum;60 students at the primary school level were
taught the party’s history, policies and programs, and the interpretation of socialist
doctrine by the leaders. Hence, many of the policies were a continuation of those carried
out in the colonial period at the expense of curricular innovations. Education models to a
58
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large extent still emphasized primary and middle-school systems, while secondary
education was still limited. Overall there was general apprehension about restructuring
curricula, as deviations from the colonial models were regarded often with suspicion.61
This was however, in stark contrast to the political leadership’s professed commitment to
the necessity for an education system which would reflect “African nature and
substance.”
Post-colonial education development also suffered from the same problems that had
existed under European rule. These included the rural to urban disparities, ethnic and
geographic inequality of access, poor teacher training, and differences between
missionary and non-missionary based education.62 There was a pressing need to address
the problem of education differences and disparities in those countries where the colonial
system had failed to develop an “educated elite.” This was especially so for the Congo
where, in spite of high literacy, underdevelopment in manpower training and educational
opportunities created vast disparities after independence. Moreover, many of the
mounting problems were an extension of the economic policies pursued by governments,
which had embraced the concept of “comprehensive development planning.”63 In many
cases plans for education expansion were interwoven with economic policy-making
which, according to Kingsley Banya and Juliet Elu, resulted in most planning models
assuming strong, simple relationships between inputs and outputs to forecast
development.64 Educational planning therefore was based on similar perceptions and
followed similar approaches. As a consequence, many of the investments in education did
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not transform into the expected outputs, while in other cases education expansion had
placed an undue strain on financial capabilities.65
In the decades to come economic hardship, coupled with poor political performance,
became definitive factors in Africa’s educational decline. According to Cyril K. Daddieh
both conditions were symbolic of “the fragility of the captured post-colonial state, with
its woefully limited administrative capacity for policy formulation and implementation
due in part to the dearth of relevant socioeconomic data and…the scarcity of skilled
manpower.”66 Even more vexing were the realities of the social pluralism of African
societies, which created added problems for the process of nation-building. To that end,
many of the democratic gains at independence were sacrificed to achieve the goal of
maximum political and social unity, as well as economic development. What resulted
however, were various forms of “neopatrimonial” authoritarian regimes that expanded
governmental powers while at the same time shrinking the social and political arena. This
was characterized by stringent prohibitions that limited constitutional guarantees on
individual rights and freedoms while at the same time strengthening the hand of the state.
While the commitment to education remained relatively strong in many countries, the
uniqueness of Africa’s “noepatrimonialism” did not facilitate much in the way of
developing a democratic consciousness in citizens. Furthermore, education as practiced in
these countries was not directed towards democracy. Since the 1990s however, many
African states have embraced various constitutional reforms directed toward a revival of
democracy, with education playing a substantial role in overall development. In the
following chapter I will analyze the extent to which education has contributed to Africa’s
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democratic development. My hope is to recast education as part of the reformed political
systems that promote justice, national unity, social equality, and democracy.
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Chapter Four

My investigation into whether education can foster democratic values and behaviors
for Africa will proceed with an examination of the education models of Botswana,
Ghana, and Uganda. Given the unique structures and historical developmental paths of
African societies my analysis will focus on the extent to which the models have fulfilled
objectives of education access and equality, nation-building, and democracy seen in
terms of political participation, the rule of law, social and economic equality, and human
rights.
Botswana:
Political Background
Since gaining independence in 1966, Botswana has strived to maintain its democratic
institutions, whereas in many other African countries authoritarian leadership has
prevailed. In terms of the relationship between democracy and development, Botswana is
“unique” and a model for success. On the one hand, Botswana has been one of the fastest
growing countries in Africa, a country which has one of the longest records of democratic
rule. On the other hand, it has been able to debunk conceptual expectations having
embarked on its experiment in democracy at a time when the country was a low-income
one. Botswana’s “uniqueness” is derived from the fact that it has consistently managed to
maintain its democratic commitments even though the popular trend in Africa has seemed
to be to undermine them; it has maintained high economic growth, sound fiscal policies,
and regular elections.1 By comparison to most other African countries, Botswana
represents a successful example of a country which has remained focused on cherishing
1
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its democratic ideals. After independence leaders in Botswana “prioritized the building of
a democratic nation whose objectives were to give birth to the development of a socially,
economically, and politically independent state.”2 The hopes for the newly independent
nation were undermined however, by the fact that at independence Botswana was one of
the poorest countries in the world with a GDP per capita of about US$80.3
As a natural consequence Botswana’s education system suffered from major setbacks.
The rapid rate of population growth, coupled with the demands for education expansion,
created an unprecedented challenge for the new government to make educational reform
a first priority. The education system was then geared to meet the needs of a country with
limited human resources. Thus, there was an emphasis on secondary and tertiary
opportunities with special attention to the improvement in the quality of primary
schooling.4 In the years following independence the number of primary schools increased
by 33 percent, from 251 to 335, while enrolments increased by 76 percent.5 Likewise, the
demand for teachers rose as that number expanded significantly from 1,673 to 3,921 or
by 134 percent.6 Educational development continued steadily in terms of the primary
school system and major progress was also made in teacher training. However, in terms
of achievements, schools were not even meeting their narrow objectives as “evidenced by
the very low [scores on] achievement tests and higher outputs of school leavers who
could not read.”7
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Under the initiative of the then president, Sir Seretse Khama, the government came up
with the model program Education for Kagisano in 1977, which was intended to remove
existing inequalities and to build an education system that would meet the needs of a
democratic society. It was believed that through this model, education would contribute
to building a strong democracy by enabling individuals the opportunity to participate,
either directly or through representation, in decisions affecting their lives. This approach
was based on the notion that in order for democracy to function, citizens should be
equipped with the skills and competence to take part in the affairs that affect them.
Education for Kagisano can be interpreted as a political experiment as well as an
“emancipatory” pedagogy.8 Situated both politically and geographically between Zambia,
South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, Botswana was influenced by a tradition that
discouraged the promotion of education along ethnic or linguistic lines.9 Thus, as in most
of Sub-Saharan Africa, European traditions were ingrained in Botswana’s education
system. The goal of Education for Kagisano was to design an education policy that would
meet the goals of Botswana as a non-racial society in a unified nation. Therefore, nationbuilding was the primary aim and was based on the four national principles of
democracy, development, self-reliance, and unity.10
Educational Reforms for Democracy
The vision of Education for Kagisano was that of a universal junior secondary
education, which was essentially nine years of basic education. This was to be
accomplished through community-based day high schools offering a three year program
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following seven years of primary schooling.11 Although this was to be accomplished
within ten years, “the rapid economic development that occurred in Botswana as a result
of the discovery of diamonds, made possible the creation of community junior secondary
schools” earlier.12 In the years between 1985 and 1992 education was granted more
funding than had been anticipated, with development expenditure being 73 percent above
targets, and receiving over 22 percent of the recurrent budget.13 Furthermore, this
expansion was aided by United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
initiatives linked to major international educational development projects. As a result,
Botswana was able to develop projects to improve efficiency, teacher training, and
curriculum development and implementation. The National Commission on Education
(NCE)14 also recommended that Setswana, the national language, be taught in schools.
Therefore, Education for Kagisano “resulted in the creation of a national education
system that explicitly identified steps towards nationalization.”15
The notion of an education for democracy raises expectations of empowerment and
full participation within the education system. The extent to which democracy is covered
in Botswana’s education system is explicitly set out in the goals of the Junior Secondary
School program and its Social Studies curriculum. According to the NCE, the Junior
Secondary school system was to promote democracy through:
1. An understanding of society, appreciation of culture, and sense of citizenship; and
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2. Critical thinking, problem-solving ability, individual initiatives and interpersonal
skills.16
Under the recommendation of the 1994 Revised National Policy on Education (RNPE) a
three year social studies syllabus was incorporated into the social studies curriculum as a
means of encouraging democracy in the educational environment. The contents were
meant to focus on the development of skills, values, and knowledge students were to
demonstrate if they are to become informed and empowered Botswana citizens in the
new millennium.”17
Among the stated aims of the program emphasis was placed on understanding the
concept of governance and the structure of government, as well as the concept of justice,
good citizenship, and participation in the growth and development of society.18
Moreover, topics were geared toward teaching the obligations of citizens, the
constitution, basic human rights and responsibilities, and separation and limitations of
powers among the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. Of the various objectives
set out in the syllabus the relationship between education and democracy is made specific
in pupils’ visit to the “kgotla.”19 In keeping the tradition of consensus building,
individuals converge at the kgotla, which is usually centrally located, to democratically
resolve critical issues concerning the society. At the kgotla students can broaden their
understandings of concepts such as conflict resolution and decision-making, as well as
the role of citizens’ obligations to the democratic process.
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The extent that Botswana has been able to realize its goal of education for social
harmony has been a matter of growing debate. In terms of quantitative expansion its
education system is by far one of the most impressive as education expenditure is high at
26 percent of government spending.20 In addition, the government is close to achieving
universal and free education and literacy levels continue to increase on average for both
male and female.21 One would also expect that the pursuit of a nationalist education
agenda that promotes democracy would facilitate the development of strong democratic
institutions within society. Botswana has exhibited a strong commitment to national
development; it has provided extensive social services in addition to having a solid liberal
economy. However, in terms of the nature and quality of its education, there exist
obvious limitations that may challenge Botswana’s celebrated status.
Concern has arisen over the relationship between the government and civil society,
specifically minority groups, in the educational process. Of particular concern is whether
education has promoted equality and national unity since one would expect, that in
practice, the education system would advance strong democratic relationships within
society. However, in spite of curricula innovations, the official policy is not designed to
be inclusive since it has not fully integrated the indigenous minority into the education
system. Furthermore, the ideal of a democratic, non-racial society has been criticized as
being in actuality a guise for the submergence of indigenous cultural, political, economic,
and social rights.
Botswana’s leadership has favored the dominant ethnic group, the Tswana, who have
long dominated the political realm. These outcomes however, can be traced to a colonial
20
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context that promoted a chieftainship system22 that helped to facilitate the political
dominance of a single ethnic group.23 In this context education development favored the
Tswana royalty while the Basarwa (San/Bushmen) and the Bakalagadi remained
marginalized. Underlying this disparity was the belief that education would give subject
people the same social status as the Tswana or give them ideas about social climbing.
Although Kagisano was expected to transcend ethnic disparities in terms of access and
the quality of education, government policy is perceived to be still restrictive. This much
is reflected in the government’s language policy that permits only Setswana and English
in schools, thereby denying non-Setswana speaking minorities their basic right to an
education as advocated in the Revised National Policy on Education.24
That the Tswana have been able to maintain its dominance over Botswana society was
the result of the country’s political development, which followed a path that lacked any
meaningful “struggle” and the concomitant absence of a tradition of questioning. As
Kenneth Good notes, “a major reason for this smoothness was that the [transition to
independence] took place collaboratively between an indigenous elite and a colonial elite,
with little or no engagement by the people.”25Consequently, political rights are curtailed
by the dominance of the major Setswana-speaking tribes to whom leadership was granted
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in the Constitution.26 This dynamic meant that minority groups not belonging to the
ruling elite had very little means to affect political change.
The 2001 Balopi Commission Report represented an effort by which the government
sought to address the “minority question” in terms of individual and collective rights.
According to Jacqueline Solway, “the Balopi Commission represented a remarkable shift
in public consciousness…of an issue that, only some years ago, was viewed as an
insignificant ‘subversive’ undercurrent,” since the idea of minority rights was virtually
unimaginable.27 While the government published and accepted the findings of the
Commission and there were constitutional amendments made in 2005,28 many scholars
have argued that not much was done to eliminate the discriminatory nature of the
Constitution. As noted by Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin specific references calling for
changes to the Tribal Territories Act were simply replaced by measures that facilitated
Tswana dominance.29 Moreover, what appears to be communicated remains a policy of
ethnic equality that is fine as long as the Twsana remain “more equal” than others.
Botswana’s ability to both avoid international criticism and defy conventional
scenarios of ethnic strife can be understood by looking at the manner in which it has
maintained its democracy. According to 2010 Freedom House estimates based on
Botswana’s political rights, the country is considered “free” in democratic terms.30 The
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regularity of Botswana’s elections since independence is commendable; it has held free
and fair elections every five years, and has maintained well-developed democratic
institutions in comparison to its African neighbors. Since 1994 the voting age was
decreased from 21 to 18 years and the country continues to promote “a universal civic
identity that virtually all citizens embrace with pride.”31 By African standards the country
has been very effective at promoting citizens’ welfare, delivering basic services, and
containing internal competition and conflict. Yet despite these exceptional qualities and
the state’s desire to perpetuate its vision of ethnic homogeneity,32 the government,
through implicit and explicit methods, continues to support exclusionary practices “that
are increasingly seen as limiting if not perverting Botswana’s democracy.”33
Having reviewed somewhat the extent to which the philosophy of Kagisano has
affected or challenged social change in Botswana, my conclusion is that the relationship
is difficult to assess. In terms of access and quality Kagisano has had commendable
results. As pointed out earlier, the government continues to make education a priority and
investment in education is seen as vital to the development of the country. Botswana
continues to defy expectations resulting in many assessments that applaud the country
while overlooking issues of great concern. While Kenneth Good praises Botswana’s
success, he nevertheless perceives its democracy as a “negative peace;”34 it has
“combined high growth rates and visible development, with a structural autocracy that
belies its benign image internationally.”35 With regard to its limitations, critics have
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argued that Botswana has fallen short of its image as the “African Miracle” in many
ways.
Aside from the lack of meaningful reforms to protect and promote minority rights, the
government has not done enough to ameliorate socio-economic inequalities long existing
in the country. According to United Nations Development Program Indicators, Botswana
ranks third highest in the world in its GINI coefficient, a measure of the inequality of
income distribution, behind Comoros and Namibia.36 From 2000 to 2007, 31.2 percent of
the population lived on less than $1.25 per day, while 49.4 percent lived on less than $2
per day.37 The richest 10 percent of the population have access to a 51.2 percent share of
income or expenditures. Aside from the provision of health and education services, it is
quite clear that not everyone has benefitted meaningfully from raised incomes or higher
standards of living. Compounding this problem is the rural to urban disparity in which
economic differentiation is most exemplified between the elite and the indigenous
communities, who have traditionally settled in remote regions. Not surprisingly, these
regions have benefitted the least from development programs that were designed to
improve both education access and job opportunities.
The fact that Botswana has been able to avoid or bypass substantial political struggle
in its democratic development created what many describe as a lower level of political
consciousness.38 Unlike its neighbors (South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia) a culture
of struggle did not shape Botswana’s political experience. The fact that it was able to
fashion significant components of a liberal system without entirely discarding pre-
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existing structures has enhanced its success.39 However, at the same time, the continued
capacity of Botswana’s seemingly contradictory policy of non-racialism exposes the
limited nature of its peaceful democracy. Especially on the issue of minority rights, the
government has failed to provide equal rights to all Botswana citizens. While crafting an
education model for peace and national unity may in the long run promote structural and
institutional changes such as human rights laws, improvement of civil rights and
freedoms, and greater political awareness, Botswana must first rethink its understanding
of what exactly constitutes its democracy if education is to function effectively in the
democratic process.
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Chapter Five: Ghana

Political Background
Ghana’s post- colonial political development was animated by a nationalist movement
that promoted democracy and self-rule. Led by Kwame Nkrumah, the former colony
announced its independence in 1957 and was quickly heralded as a bastion and initiator
of independence and democracy for Africa. “But the country’s liberal democratic
constitution was quickly sidelined as civil liberties were suspended,” a one-party state
was declared, and Nkrumah installed himself as lifelong leader.1 Nkrumah was
overthrown in 1966 by the military. However, subsequent attempts at democratization
proved unsuccessful, as the country experienced oscillations of military and civilian rule.
From 1982 to 1993, Ghana was ruled as a quasi-military dictatorship under Flight
Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings’ Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). Until the
democratic transitions in the early 1990s, the political system of Ghana closely resembled
the authoritarian regimes that were characteristic of Africa. With the establishment of the
Fourth Republic in 1993 Ghana returned to civilian rule and embarked on a peaceful
transition to democratic governance.
For many observers, Ghana’s continued commitment to education can be closely
linked to its commitment to democracy. Having been the first of the former British
dependencies in Africa to achieve independence and a real measure of internal selfgovernance, Ghana has long been regarded as a leader in African political and
educational development. Despite the tradition of military rule, Ghanaians have a deep
sense of political consciousness to which the values and principles of democracy are very
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important. On balance, Ghanaians have overwhelmingly supported the democratic
political reforms of the 1990s (72 percent according to one poll) with a clear majority
preferring democracy to any other form of government (75 percent).2 It is little wonder
therefore that popular perceptions of democracy tend to subscribe to universal notions of
civil and voting rights, and equality of participation and representation.3 This deliberative
quality of democracy, expressed in terms of political rights, is regarded as an opportunity
for empowerment that translates for most Ghanaians into a positive image of democracy.
The movement towards constitutional rule in late 1992, in addition to gradual
structural and institutional reforms, is reflective of the political traditions that emerged
during decolonization in the 1950s. According to Lindsay Whitfield, the traditions and
ideologies long established by the two founding political parties- the Convention
People’s Party (with a base in the neo-traditionalist/educated elites) and United Gold
Coast Convention (nationalist/broad-based)- have produced a credible competitive twoparty system to which Ghanaians, both the elite and the masses, are mobilized.4 As a
result, no one party or political leader dominates the political process. While some
regions are seen as strongholds for one or the other main parties because they contain a
large number of core voters and there is not much competition,5 most “are seen as swing
regions where the two parties compete fairly evenly for votes.”6 In essence, Ghanaian
politics has been able to transcend, to a large degree, the ethnic and regional divisions
that have characterized many other African countries.
2
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Evidence from Ghana’s highly competitive 2008 elections where outcomes were
based on cross-cutting social cleavages reveals that ethnicity plays only one role in party
identification.7 Having reverted to constitutional civilian rule, Ghana has, over the past
several decades, developed stabilizing mechanisms that have helped to further solidify its
democratic political system. Among these mechanisms, Whitfield has identified Ghana’s
independent Electoral Commission and its transparent electoral processes as two of the
most stabilizing characteristics that have worked to structure elite behavior, thereby
institutionalizing the political process.8 Moreover, the transitions ushered in a
considerable degree of political liberalization that created a political space for civil
society. Accordingly, non-governmental associations proliferated, with many throwing
themselves into civic and political activism.9 It is rather fitting therefore that within this
political framework Ghana’s expansive education system would also promote the
cultivation of democratic values.
Educational Reforms for Democracy
A central objective of the constitutional reforms during Ghana’s transition to civilian
rule in the 1990s has been the Free and Compulsory Universal Basic Education Program
(FCUBE). Under Article 39 (2) of the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, FCUBE
was conceived as a way to increase both the effectiveness of the teaching and learning
tasks of the primary school system, as well as a response to the political changes initiated
at the time. To be certain education development had always been a priority for the
Ghanaian leadership. However, in spite of numerous attempts by successive governments
to improve the overall education system, inputs were still not sufficient for improving
7
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school quality and learning outcomes. Furthermore, many of the educational gains
incurred since independence were not reflected in political performance and economic
management. An evaluation of FCUBE however, will focus on the role education reforms
have played in meeting constitutional obligations.
FCUBE was established as part of the new constitutional reforms to restore civilian
rule and greater economic development and growth for Ghana. Moreover, it was
undertaken in conjunction with greater initiatives with the international community10 in
which the promotion of universal primary education (UPE) was a top priority among
development goals. The reforms also coincided with Ghana’s (re)democratization that
took place in the early 1990s. Assuming Ghana was committed to her constitutional
obligations FCUBE was heralded as a major step towards reconciling Ghanaian
education with national objectives. FCUBE was not “new” in terms of themes and ideas.
In fact, many of the objectives espoused under previous reforms11 sought to make the
curriculum more relevant to social and economic needs in spite of subsequent failures.
The new framework was unique in the sense that its implementation was mandated in the
new constitution and was based on the notion that democracy depends on good
educational systems that promote inclusiveness.
The implementation of FCUBE demanded many changes to Ghana’s education
system. These included “different ways of knowledge, different ideas about the nature,
purpose, and scope of school subjects, and the ways in which the needs of a diverse
student population might be met.”12 “By requiring that all Ghanaians receive nine years
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of free schooling, the government wished to ensure that graduates of the basic education
system were prepared for further education and skill training.”13 According to the
Ministry of Education (MOE), this was to be achieved through the following objectives:
(i ) improve the quality of teaching and learning ;( ii) improve management efficiency
and sustainability ;( iii) increase access and partnership; and (iv) decentralize the
management of the education sector.14 Furthermore, through the establishment of a nonpartisan National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE), the government, through
various learning initiatives, has sought to foster a commitment to the principles and
values as expressed in the Constitution.
According to estimates based on a comparative study of the implementation of UPE
programs in Africa, enrollment rates have gradually increased for Ghana since the
implementation of FCUBE in 1992.15 Gross enrollment rates for primary schools stood at
92.7 percent in the period 2005/06, while attainment rates were relatively high on
average.16 In the past decade public expenditure on education has varied between 28
percent and 40 percent of Ghana’s annual budget.17 Furthermore, in terms of the quality
of the education provided, the country continues to maintain a high standard of schooling
and major steps have been taken to improve the quality of education delivery in the
country. This is especially so for rural areas, which have historically been disadvantaged
in the distribution of education benefits. While disparities remain in terms of the share of
public education expenditure between rural and urban areas, since the adoption of
13
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FCUBE total education subsidies for rural primary education have remained consistently
high.18 Over the years a number of donor countries and aid agencies have been major
supporters of FCUBE. Backers have focused on the promotion of in-service teacher
training courses, national assessment systems, and the establishment of “model” schools.
The approach was meant to establish effective teaching procedures that were pupilcentered with the goal of giving educators more direct influence in the classroom.
In an effort to promote democratic culture in schools the government encourages the
setting up of civic and other social clubs to foster the principles of integrity, tolerance,
and good-citizenship. Furthermore, it has allowed the school governing system to involve
student body representatives in decision-making and deliberations of school and
educational governance. Apart from these provisions, since the establishment of the
National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE), 850 civic education clubs have been
created throughout Ghana with the specific aim of consolidating democracy through
youth participation.19 This past year the Commission has sought to achieve these
objectives through the reintroduction of civic studies in the school curriculum, and
teacher training workshops in four regions (Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Eastern and the
Greater Accra Region)20 with the intention of expanding the project to other areas. This
was in large part due to a perceived lack of initiative on the Ministry of Education in
regards to effective civic education. Furthermore, with the assistance of the Center for
Civic Education in the United States and other donors, the NCCE has promoted several
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regional showcases with the specific aim of identifying and solving problems in schools
and communities.
Overall the evidence suggests that expanded educational opportunities would
influence Ghanaians’ attitudes to politics in general and democracy in particular. Results
taken from a national survey sampling citizens’ orientations to politics found that, on
average, most Ghanaians (72 percent) were attentive to the political world around them.21
Moreover, regarding political knowledge, many knew their leaders and elected officials
while some could impressively identify individuals who wield power. On average most
Ghanaians support democracy and continue to have faith in representative politics, as this
is evident from the very high proportions of citizens’ participation in recent elections.22
While there is no meaningful difference in support for democracy between Ghana’s urban
and rural areas, the citizens more attuned to democratic politics (freedom of speech,
rights of association, electoral choice) were overwhelmingly urban and had more than ten
years of formal schooling.23 Not surprisingly perhaps because of lesser educational
opportunities, political apathy was higher among poor and less educated people, many of
whom felt uncomfortable expressing their political opinions and lacked interest in politics
or government.24 For this group democracy is largely associated with the government’s
ability to deliver basic public goods such as education, healthcare, and employment
opportunities.
While the government has indeed made important strides towards the improvement of
the quality of both its political and educational systems, a significant disparity remains in
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its ability to deliver socio-political goods. For instance, when Ghanaians were asked
about living standards almost one-half (46 percent) said that things have worsened since
the democratic transition.25 The evidence is especially striking for populations in rural
regions and among women, who are still faced with the traditional syndrome of barriers
to educational opportunities.26 Despite prioritized policy objectives that emphasize
gender parity in access to education, illiteracy continues to be more prevalent among
women than men.27 Moreover, educational services are considerably lacking for females
in Northern Ghana who, apart from being vulnerable to socio-economic factors, are also
affected by societal and cultural beliefs about the subordinate role of women.28
Beyond the achievements of the Free and Compulsory Universal Basic Education,
many rural communities continue to experience limited access to education. This point is
made by many observers who contend that while free schooling has increased national
enrollments on the primary level, full access to basic education in Northern Ghana
remains elusive to the government, which is the main provider of education.29 The facts
on the ground suggest that while much progress has been made in recent years to bridge
the gap between the north and south,30 “state efforts at reaching the underserved through
traditional formal systems are not reaching the most marginalized and deprived
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communities.”31 Among the reasons given for this setback were high opportunity costs,
traditional beliefs and values, and a lack of political will. Despite the elimination of
tuition costs many rural communities are still faced with indirect costs such as the cost of
uniforms and school supplies, which many cannot afford. And, although gross enrollment
rates are high (92 percent) more than a third of those who are enrolled do not complete
basic education.32 Socio-economic factors have also been cited as the main reason why
many school-aged children drop out since they are often required to work to support their
families.
Aside from socio-economic factors, the general lack of political will on the part of the
Ghanaian government to implement a clear education strategy for the North has been
regarded as a major obstacle. The criticism comes in spite of collaborative efforts with
international NGOs to implement Complementary Education Programs (CEP) with the
specific aim of providing education to deprived communities. In particular, since 1995,
CEP initiatives such as The School for Life33 has been effective at providing education to
children ages 8-14 who otherwise would have no access to a formal education. Upon
completion of the program many of the graduates transition into formal settings. The
success of CEP has been the result of the application of learning models that cater to the
linguistic and traditional/cultural diversity in the rural regions. While these programs do
indeed fill an access gap, the number of children they benefit pales in comparison to the
formal system. Far worse is the relative lack of initiatives to make CEP a priority in an
effort to reach marginalized children who cannot attend formal schools. For instance,
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there is no stated policy in the Ghana Education System (GES) to formally replicate or
implement the learning strategies of CEPs. Thus, it has been highly recommended that in
order for these initiatives to have any meaningful impact on overall rural education
development, a more sustained and coherent effort is needed on the part of the Ghanaian
government to integrate more effective learning processes.
Encouragingly, Ghana maintains, by regional and international standards, a reasonably
high measure of support for democracy. As indicated earlier, a clear majority prefers
democracy to any other form of government, and Ghanaians overwhelmingly continue to
have faith in the deliberative quality of elections. A great part of this success is owed to
the institutionalization of democratic systems, as evidenced by the 70 percent of
Ghanaians who have expressed satisfaction with the way democracy works.34 However,
many have argued that just as important Ghanaians feel uncertain about democracy’s
capacity to represent the interests of ordinary people. Indeed, according to Bratton,
Lewis, and Boadi, “the low frequency and poor quality of formal linkages between
citizens and elected representatives” expose the defects of the new democratic system.35
Since formal communication generally requires reading and writing, many ordinary
Ghanaians often turn to informal channels (religious leader, businessman) and
“clientelistic”36 reflexes when seeking political representation. Especially for the poor
and those in rural regions, where there is a larger propensity for informal ties, the lack of
confidence in official state channels could erode the legitimacy of democracy itself.37
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In sum, if we are to assess the relationship between education and democracy in
Ghana, we must consider at least two factors: (1) accessibility and universality; and (2)
content in terms of inculcation of civic norms and responsibilities (teaching good
citizenship). In terms of the first, my analysis shows that Ghana has indeed made strides
in offering universal education (at least at the primary level). However, the issue of
accessibility is still problematic in that there remains a significant rural to urban divide, a
gender gap, and also a geographical and ethnic divide. As for point two Ghana has indeed
included citizenship education in its curriculum. However, more effort is needed on the
part of the government to integrate more effective learning processes to overcome
challenges that threaten the access to and quality of Ghana’s education. On balance the
Ghanaian model seems to be working well enough and could be an example for others in
Africa. Most important for my work, the relationship between democracy at the level of
the government and democracy at the educational level is moderately strong.
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Chapter Six: Uganda

Political Background
Unlike Botswana and Ghana, Uganda’s post- colonial transition lacked the development
of strong democratic institutions. The country was granted internal self-government from
Britain in 1961, and the first national elections were held the same year. However, in
succeeding years, politics was mostly contentious, as supporters of a centralized state
vied with those in favor of a loose federation and strong role for tribally- based local
kingdoms, which politicized ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences. Particularly, the
political maneuvering included reconciling the role of kingdoms1 that had traditionally
held powerful positions in Uganda’s colonial past. Tensions came to a head when
Uganda’s Prime Minister, Dr. Milton Apollo Obote, suspended the constitution in1966
and took over all powers of the state, thus giving rise to what came to be known as the
1966 “crisis.”2 The “crisis” introduced a new constitution and among other things,
abolished the constitutional status of kingdoms while Uganda officially became a oneparty state.
In 1971, Obote’s government was overthrown by a military coup led by armed forces
commander Idi Amin Dada. As president, Amin dissolved the parliament and amended
the constitution to give himself absolute power. Under his rule Uganda experienced
economic decline, social disintegration, and massive human rights violations triggering
nearly 20 years of civil war. Although Amin was removed by Tanzanian forces in 1979,
the legacy of his misrule and violence continued from one regime to the next through
1

The “kingdoms” comprised a federation of kingdoms and tribes. Most notably, the kingdom of Buganda,
which had had a long history as an independent and well-organized kingdom and enjoyed privileged status
during colonial time.
2
J. Oloka-Onyango, “Constitutional Transitions in Museveni’s Uganda: New Horizons or Another False
Start?” Journal of African Law. 39 (1995): 158.

Education and Democracy

67

extra-constitutional usurpation and exercise of power.3 After the military takeover by the
National Resistance Army in 1986 Uganda returned to civilian rule under the leadership
of President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM). The NRM was
well aware of the country’s constitutional history, and was minded not to follow in the
footsteps of its predecessors.4 In particular, the NRM “was determined to break the cycle
of violence and, like many Ugandans, it believed that the cause of the country’s political,
economic, and social problems was the lack of ‘a good constitution’.”5 Immediately upon
its assumption of power the NRM, presided over by Museveni, embarked upon the
promulgation of a new constitution that was to serve as the basis for the “new” Uganda.
To be certain, the Ugandan transition required a two-pronged approach that required
the consolidation of peace and stability, as well as the creation of a new national identity
based on norms of tolerance and democracy. To that end, Museveni initiated several
reforms in an attempt to restore constitutionalism and the rule of law. The reforms
“comprised of and addressed…citizenship, human rights, political parties, the forms of
central and local government...and the safeguards for the new constitution.”6 More
specifically, the reforms sought to address the question of what form of government was
most suitable for a democratic Uganda, “the position of traditional rulers, and the role of
political parties in the post-NRM era.”7From the point of view of the NRM the challenges
of ethnic strife and political turmoil were best met with a political system that could
mobilize all Ugandans. The system was therefore guided by the NRM’s “no-party” or
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“movement” philosophy8 that was intended to be all embracing, while at the same time
overcoming the sectarian and divisive “ills” that was characteristic of Ugandan politics.
While it has been suggested that the “movement” philosophy was merely a ploy to
sustain the NRM in power for as long as possible,9 its approach to constitutionalism was
unprecedented in the country’s history and for that matter anywhere else in Africa. As
Waliggo articulates, “never before has constitution-making dominated the life of
Uganda...Never before have the Ugandan people been so actively involved at every level
and placed so much hope for stability and democratization in the constitutional
process.”10 Given the country’s recent political history the NRM was forced to delve into
policy issues which were not normally “constitutionalized”.11 In this respect the Ugandan
constitution, as conceived by the NRM, became a model instrument that ushered in novel
institutions of governance resulting in fundamental change in Ugandan politics. It is
therefore a credit to the NRM that it was able to involve the people of Uganda in the
constitution-making process, thus ensuring the document’s legitimacy, credibility, and
permanence.
Given the nature of Uganda’s post-colonial political development and the subsequent
constitutional reforms, it would be fitting to investigate the extent to which the transition
has affected Ugandans’ understanding of democracy. Indeed, after 30 years of autocratic
rule and civil war constitutional changes have led to the resumption of formal democratic
institutions. However, this also requires a robust measure of political support and
8
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activism on the part of Ugandans. In general, Ugandans classify their country’s political
regime as a democracy. According to an Afro-barometer estimate on citizens’ attitudes to
democracy in Uganda,12 the majority understand democracy in largely universal terms.
Citizens perceived democracy in terms of “civil liberties” or “personal freedoms,”
elections, and voting. This much was reflected in the responses about the current state of
political freedoms in which an estimated nine out of ten Ugandans said they were
“somewhat” or “completely free” to join any political organization they wanted.13
Another “86 percent felt that people were free to ‘choose who to vote for without feeling
pressured’” and most felt they were similarly free to “say what they think.”14
On a range of other questions assessing the quality of Uganda’s democracy over half
of Ugandans say the country is a democracy with just under half (48 percent) being
“fairly” satisfied with the way democracy worked.15 While Ugandans strongly endorse
the idea of elections as the source of political authority, surprisingly, just one-half felt
that elections (based on 2006 results) were “completely free and fair.”16 Despite an
increase in electoral competitiveness, many Ugandans have also expressed doubts about
the electoral process, with just 44 percent saying that elections “serve to ensure that the
MPs reflect the views of the voters.”17 This perceived lack of confidence in the electoral
process is obvious when compared to the higher views expressed about the 1996 (79
percent) and 2001 (67 percent) presidential elections.
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Notwithstanding Ugandans’ popular support for democracy Mattes, Kibirige, and
Sentamu have noted that overall levels of basic “democratic literacy” have not moved in
any significant way over the past decade.18 Despite broad levels of political freedom and
a strong constituency for democracy it has been noted that many adults are still not aware
of their rights and duties as citizens.19 Needless to say, the NRM has promoted various
initiatives to achieve unity and significant attitude change in support for democracy.
However, on various aspects of democratic citizenship (popular sovereignty, political
activism, pluralism) the actual state of progress has been slow.20 Furthermore, it has been
argued that democratic education has mostly been conducted to satisfy the current state of
governance and the party in power.21 While the government has made substantial efforts
to increase voter education to improve the electoral process, to influence real
development of Uganda’s democracy education needs to play a greater role in building
civic competence and entrenching democratic culture. My investigation of Uganda’s
civic education will first proceed with its provision of primary education, since this will
increase the probability for democratic development.
Educational Reforms for Democracy
Uganda’s democratic transition and subsequent establishment of competitive elections
in 1996 were also relevant to the establishment of free universal primary education
(UPE). Like many other democratically elected governments in Africa the Ugandan
initiative to remove primary school fees has been closely linked to democratic politics.
According to David Stasavage it is possible to attribute a link between electoral
18
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competition and a new education initiative, since electoral democracy has prompted
many African leaders to prioritize the delivery of public services and become more
accountable to the electorate.22 The implementation of the UPE initiative therefore,
became a central aspect of President Museveni’s 1996 election campaign, which was the
first presidential election since the democratic transition. As such the elections presented
a plausible electoral challenge in that it emphasized the political nature of the provision
of UPE. For instance, “during the weeks leading up to the 1996 vote opposition candidate
Paul Ssemogerere declared that he would match Museveni’s promise to provide free
primary education.”23 Furthermore, education had been a salient political issue for large
segments of the population,24 for whom primary education is most frequently the only
level of formal education they would receive. Upon his re-election Museveni announced
the abolition of school fees for four children to every family25 and the program came into
effect in 1997.
Uganda’s UPE initiative is arguably one of the more successful attempts of an African
government to broaden education access.26 Among the stated aims of the education
initiative was to provide equitable access to quality and affordable education to all
Ugandans, meet commitments to achieve Education for All and the Millennium
Development Goals by 2015, and propel the nation towards achieving the goals of
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Poverty Eradication Action Plan.27 Furthermore, through partnerships with the
international community and donor agencies the government has been able to implement
education programs in many rural regions, especially in the war-affected districts in the
North. In essence, UPE provision was integral to the NRM’s stated goals of transforming
Uganda into an economically and politically developed country.
Since the implementation of UPE total primary school enrollments increased from 3.4
million in 1996 to 7.1 million by 2006, an increase of 149 percent over pre-UPE
enrollments.28 Since 1997, gross enrollment ratios have hovered at about 100 percent,
suggesting that the program has been able to capture more individuals than those in the
relevant school age group.29 Due to the prior establishment of macroeconomic stability
the government was able to make considerable investments into primary education
provision. As a result, the share of education expenditure rose from an average of 20.2
percent to an average of 26.3 percent in the three years following the UPE
announcement.30 Public spending on education as a percentage of government
expenditure was 15.04 percent as of 2009.31 Encouragingly, the increases in enrollment
and education spending have also helped to reduce inequalities in primary school rates
between regions, and between boys and girls.32 However, the government needs to make
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a very serious effort to improve education quality, while maintaining its impressive
accomplishments with respect to coverage.
In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda the promotion of civic
education was mandated under a national Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC).
Among other things the Commission was to “formulate, implement, and oversee
programs intended to inculcate in the citizens of Uganda awareness of their civic
responsibilities and an appreciation of their rights and obligations as free people.”33 For
the purposes of carrying out UHRC’s mandate a committee was set up to bring together a
number of constitutional bodies to carry out civic education. These constitutional bodies
are the Electoral Commission, the Judicial Service Commission, and the Inspectorate of
Government, as well as the two bodies representing civic groups involved in civic
education (the Human Rights Network and the Uganda Women’s Network).34 In 2008,
the UHRC implemented a civic education program intended to build the capacity of
existing institutions at district and grassroots levels to act as agents of civic education and
human rights.35
Early civic education programs within Uganda were undertaken as part of the NRM’s
expansive efforts to achieve popular participation and support for constitutional reforms.
Mostly, the initiatives sought to involve the ordinary citizen in the making of the
constitution. Notable groups were the early Resistance Councils, now the Local Councils,
which elected the representatives to the National Resistance Councils. Also notable were
33
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the political education courses known as “Chaka Mchaka” cadre training.36 It was hoped
that through popular participation “the people would respect and uphold the new
constitution and, in the long run, prevent its subversion.”37 In later years, there had been
deliberate attempts to teach civics at the primary school level; civics was already a part of
the social studies curriculum as well as the political education subjects examined at
Ordinary Level (O-Level).38
Under the guidelines of the UHRC civic education has mostly been conducted through
partnerships with civil society organizations (CSOs).39 This however, is not surprising
given the role civil society plays in legitimating and promoting political values and
institutions. Indeed, the groups accredited to carry out civic education programs have
increased in both number and the issues they undertake. As a result, CSO involvement in
the environment, women, population, and governance has been brought to the forefront.
Especially on the issue of women’s rights, NGOs such as Uganda Women’s Network
(UWONET) have overwhelmingly made advances for women on education, health, and
politics. According to Matovu NGOs have played a major role in the field of education
through the construction of schools, the promotion of basic education, and the
development of new education initiatives in the war-affected districts in northern
Uganda.40
A review of Uganda’s UHRC initiative reveals that in spite of extensive efforts to
fulfill its constitutional mandate, civic education is still fragmented and underdeveloped.
36
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As a result, CSOs tend to pursue individual agendas without consulting the UHRC,
thereby emphasizing aspects of the civic education program considered important to
them,41 which in many cases has undermined the goals of the UHRC. It has been
suggested that many civic education programs, such as voter education, tend to
emphasize issues that complement state activities.42 Moreover, since many CSOs depend
on funding from the government critics argue that they are often used for political
purposes and for that matter the political education of the NRM’s “movement” politics.43
Furthermore, because CSOs have traditionally played a more facilitative role in Ugandan
society their ability to actively promote democratic awareness is reduced so much so that
they lack the autonomy to challenge the government. In this respect, institutions of civil
society (media, trade unions, cooperatives, business groups, religious groups) are
weakened in their power relations with the government to the point where the line
between civil society and government remains blurred.44
As noted earlier, civic education programs were central to the socio-political efforts of
the NRM’s constitutional reforms. Later attempts to engage public participation were
undertaken in subsequent referenda, most notably the 2005 proposal to reinstitute multiparty politics. Although multi-party politics have since resumed Uganda’s democracy has
remained relatively unchanged. In light of evidence reflecting Uganda’s recent history,
large majorities continue to prefer democracy to alternative forms of government.45 Yet,
many Ugandans continue to exhibit dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy as
41
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provided by the government.46 While Uganda is by no means considered a “full”
democracy, its “movement” system raises important questions about the extent to which
Ugandan politics can be described as democratic. Furthermore, observers have expressed
doubt that the re-introduction of formal multi-party politics has done much to improve
the legitimacy of the political system, since socio-political activities are still to a large
degree controlled by the government.47
Despite the government’s stated commitment to constitutionalism and democratic
sustainability, evidence suggests that the increasing power of the state has been the most
significant obstacle to the expansion of democracy and the rule of law in Uganda.48 Since
the era of political reform in the 1990s the NRM, through political and coercive means,
has systematically stalled the expansion of political competition, thereby entrenching its
power for the immediate future.49 For example, following the 2005 referendum,
Museveni persuaded parliament to lift the presidential term limits as laid down in the
1995 Constitution to allow for a third elected term. Nevertheless, there has been growing
opposition to his presidency both from within the ruling party and from the electorate.
According to Tangri and Mwenda rank-and-file NRM MPs have also clashed with
Museveni regarding his overbearing style in government, particularly his control over the
NRM parliamentary caucus, which has made them increasingly subservient to the
executive.50 In terms of official election results, “Museveni’s support had been falling: 75
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percent in 1996, 68 percent in 2001, and 59 percent in 2006.”51 And, while he was able to
recapture the presidency in 2011 with 68.4percent of the votes,52 the elections were not
without controversy.
Still, Museveni continues to elicit support from many Ugandans, as well as with
international donors, who credit Uganda’s stability and development to his rule.
However, in his quest to be president for life Museveni has in essence, betrayed the very
ideals he vowed to uphold; “institutions such as parliament, the judiciary, and the
Electoral Commission have [constantly] had their independence eroded in the face of
Museveni’s desire for untrammeled power.”53 In this vein, Muvesevi today is reminiscent
of the early “founding fathers” who interpreted the legitimacy of their roles in the
liberation struggle as a life-time endorsement of personal rule.54 Much like his
predecessors, Museveni’s mode of governance has elevated him into a “presidential
monarch” with his movement politics no more than a “single-party” regime.
Unfortunately, with Museveni’s tight grip on power it is highly doubtful that Ugandan
politics can create a broader framework for participation and empowerment.
To conclude, the Ugandan case is an interesting variation on the African experience.
Unlike Botswana, Uganda has experienced major political disruption and civil conflict.
Unlike Ghana, this disruption has been deeply harmful to the development of democratic
norms. In Ghana, democratic values were sufficiently embedded that after the military
left the country was able to recover these values and work to continue to embed them into
the educational system.
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In Uganda’s case, the severity of civil conflict engendered the prioritization of
political stability over the inculcation of democratic values. In order to facilitate societal
cohesion after the civil war, the educational system was geared toward nationalist values.
Civic education was introduced but this was designed toward promoting a united society
rather than democratic individualism. On the on hand, this promotion of societal cohesion
is arguably, positive for the development of the country. After all, democratic values
cannot be embedded in a divided society. Thus this stage of civic education can be
viewed as a prerequisite for deeper development. On the other hand, the creeping
authoritarianism of Museveni certainly hinders prospects for democracy. In the civic
sector, Uganda can claim to have succeeded where even Botswana has not, that is, in
reaching out to all sectors of society through its UPE and UHRC. However, CSOs have
tended to be co-opted in the process. Overall, Uganda is a mixed bag: while it can be
lauded for inclusion, its various attempts to foster democratic education still suffer from
various deficiencies.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion

In my thesis I set out to explore the relationship between education and democracy. I
argued that in order for education to have a meaningful impact on prospects for a
sustainable democracy, educational systems must support democratic principles and
ideals. My objective was to investigate the extent to which education models promoted
democratic ideals and in doing so, fostered democratic values and behaviors. To conduct
my research I focused on the education models adopted in three African countries:
Botswana, Ghana, and Uganda.
As one of the few African countries that has upheld democratic rule, Botswana
devised an education model, Education for Kagisano, as a means for nation-building,
development, and democracy. However, while it is lauded for its democratic
commitments, its education system is influenced by a tradition that discourages the
promotion of education along ethnic and linguistic lines. Ghana, having reverted to
civilian rule in the late 1980s, has made deliberate efforts to design an expansive
educational system that can enhance its democracy and development. Despite
considerable gains in educational development and having one of the strongest
democracies in Africa, the issue of education access is still problematic. Unlike Botswana
and Ghana, Uganda’s formal democratization came after 30 years of autocratic rule and
civil war. As part of the transition the government implemented educational policies that
prioritized national unity and political stability. While the government continues to make
education a priority, the increasing power of the state has been shown to be the greatest
obstacle to democratic development.
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Based on my research I conclude that African education models have to a certain
degree promoted democratic ideals. However, it is not clear that they have yet been
sufficient for fostering democratic values and behaviors. Drawing from my case studies I
conclude that the education models reflect among other things, the countries’ political
systems as well as their history, and understandably so. Overall the evidence supports the
widely held view that higher education levels appear to correlate with democratic
governance. Thus the transition to democracy appears to provide governments with an
incentive to improve primary education, as evident from the case studies. Therefore, one
can draw the conclusion that the relationship between education and democracy is
mutually reinforcing. However, it needs to be recognized that various factors will
undoubtedly affect this relationship and in turn, democratic sustainability
Given these unique variations in African democracy it is perhaps not surprising that
the education models are somewhat different. Thus, it may be safe to say that no one
education model is superior to the other. Taken together, each case offers a distinctive
element (Botswana’s education system supports a structured democracy; Ghana’s
education model is based on values of inclusiveness; Uganda’s education system is meant
to overcome challenges to political stability) that can provide the basis for a sound
education model for other African states. However, in terms of the “effect of education
on democratic attitudes (and thus regime type), such attitudes will depend upon the
history of educational provision for all groups in a country’s population.”1 Given Ghana’s
longer and more sustained educational experience, it is understandable that there is a
strong correlation between education and democracy. Yet, while democratic traditions

1

David Stasavage, “Democracy and Primary School Attendance: Aggregate and Individual Level Evidence
from Africa.” AfroBarometer Working Paper No. 54 (2005): 8.
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and institutions are firmly embedded in Ghanaian society one cannot say with certainty
that this was the direct result of education. Clearly, broad access to education is necessary
for mass literacy and economic and social development. But it takes a deliberate
commitment to democratic principles for education to nurture and sustain a democracy.
Bearing in mind the variations in Africa’s democratic experience, the principal task of
civic education in advancing the cause of democracy should be to help citizens acquire
and develop attitudes and competences required for democratic citizenship, as well as to
help the society to effect a transition from authoritarianism to democracy.2 According to
Gyamih-Boadi such education must be broadly accessible, liberal, and endowed with a
strong civic content.3 Therefore, in an effort to develop and sustain meaningful
democratic citizenship civic education programs should promote the following: tolerance
for opposing political beliefs and for social and cultural differences; civility in political
discourse;4 social and institutional trust, though not without some degree of healthy
skepticism and willingness to hold elite and the system as a whole to account;5 support
and commitment to democracy as a form of government against alternative political
systems; a sense of civic competence and political efficacy; and meaningful democratic
participation.
While the formal education system is an essential agency for the delivery of civic
education, it is not enough to have democracy education embedded into the everyday
school curriculum, or in “stand-alone workshops.”6 Further, as evidenced from the
2

4.
E. Gyamih-Boadi, “Reflections on Education and Democracy.” Briefing Paper: Ghana Center for
Democratic Development (CDD-GHANA) 6 (2003): 5.
4
4.
5
Steven E. Finkel, “Can Democracy be Taught? Adult Civic Education, Civil Society, and the
Development of Democratic Political Culture.” Journal of Democracy. 14 (2003): 140.
6
Mattes, Kibirige, and Sentamu, 29.
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research, the school system and “parastatal” civic education bodies are often dogged by
perceptions of pro-state bias, “especially in conditions and countries where there is weak
separation between state, government, and even the ruling party.”7 For that reason the
delivery of civic education should involve a combination of primary and secondary
educational agencies, private sector, civil society, specialized state/public institutions,
and the international community, as this would increase the plurality and delivery of
democratic content.
Finally, while the development of effective democratic citizenship will require
continuous and life-long learning on the part of individuals and society as a whole, no
amount of democratic education will work without democracy. Thus, in the final
analysis, the responsibility rests with African governments to do “simple things” such as
increasing the quality of the electoral process, enabling people to participate without
fear,8 and respecting the limitations of their own political power.

7
8

Gyimah-Boadi, 5.
Mattes, Kibirige, and Sentamu, 30.
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